Mexico and the Global Financial Market: Capital Flight as a Factor in National Economic Policy Making by Zamora, Stephen
MEXICO AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET:
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years, there has been a dramatic increase in
the integration of international financial markets, having important
implications for the regulation of financial institutions and national
monetary policy.' Although attention has primarily focused on this
phenomenon's implications for developed countries' economies, the
effects of international financial integration on developing coun-
tries' economies has not been ignored.
My focus is international financial integration and the resulting
current and future implications for Mexico due to its connection
with the global financial market. For countries like Mexico, the ex-
ternal debt problem has monopolized much attention, even though
the debt crisis is only one aspect of global financial integration.'
While there is the hope that someday the debt crisis of the 1980s
will be relegated to the history books, the creation of an integrated,
global financial market is a phenomenon that is just beginning. In
terms of overall effect, this phenomenon will influence Mexican pol-
icies to a much greater extent than the external debt crisis.
International banking has existed since the Middle Ages, and
many aspects of the global financial market, such as placing depos-
its in overseas banks, or exchanging currencies, are not new. How-
ever, the growth in volume, scale, complexity, and speed with which
today's financial institutions carry out these international activities
* Professor of Law and Director of Mexican Legal Studies, University of Houston Law
Center.
1. See generally R. PECCHIOLI, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BANKING: THE POL-
ICY ISSUES 85-125 (1983).
2. "The importance of financial markets in the transmission of economic influences
from industrial to developing countries has grown considerably as a result of the increased
levels of developing countries' external debt and the greater role of private creditors, espe-
cially international commercial banks." Goldsbrough & Zaidi, Transmission of Economic
Influences from Industrial to Developing Countries, STAFF STUDIES FOR THE WORLD ECO-
NOMIC OUTLOOK, (International Monetary Fund) July 1986, at 189.
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is new. 8 Technological developments in computers and telecommu-
nications systems, and institutional factors like the abandonment of
fixed exchange rates, have contributed to the creation of the new
phenomenon of a global financial market. As a result, financial
flows unrelated to trade in goods and services have gained new im-
portance in determining the strength or weakness of a country's in-
ternational economic health.
The debt crisis is only one result of the increased integration of
developing countries into the global financial market. After the ini-
tial shock of the debt crisis wore off, some people wondered what
had happened to the dollars that had been borrowed by Mexicans,
Brazilians and others. As we shall see,' a large percentage of these
dollars went back to the United States in the form of capital flight.
Some portion of Mexico's external debt (the exact amount is still a
matter of debate) was used to finance overseas investments by
Mexicans, rather than to finance productive capacity in Mexico.
Mexicans and others tapped into the global financial network as
investors, as well as borrowers.
The following discussion addresses the problem of capital flight
5
and whether it is likely to be a continuing feature of the Mexican
economy. The Mexican government's policies in dealing with the
threat of capital flight will also be briefly discussed. Capital flight,
facilitated by the global financial network now being established,
will become an even more important factor in government economic
policies in Mexico, further diminishing autonomous decision-mak-
ing that monetary officials wish to exercise.
I. CAPITAL FLIGHT AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISES IN
MEXICO
It is generally recognized that capital flight contributed to the
Mexican balance of payments crisis of 1982.6 However, there is dis-
3. See generally H. KAUFMAN, INTEREST RATES, THE MARKETS, AND THE NEW FINAN-
CIAL WORLD 95-101 (1986); PECCHIOLI, supra note I, at 16 et seq.
4. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
5. I realize that there is not complete agreement as to whether capital flight is a
"problem," or whether it merely represents movements of capital that respond to other,
"real" problems in the economy, and may therefore be beneficial by forcing solutions to
those problems. For a discussion of the benefits of capital mobility, but also the disadvan-
tages (especially for the short term) of capital flight, see H. Mayer, The Theory and Practice
of Floating Exchange Rates and the Role of Official Exchange Market Intervention at BIS
ECONOMIC PAPERS No. 5 (1982) 20-21, 39-41.
6. See, e.g., N. BAILEY & R. COHEN, THE MEXICAN TIME BOMB 12 (1987); D. WY-
MAN, The Mexican Economy: Problems and Prospects, MEXICO's ECONOMIC CRISIS: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES I, at 9-10 (Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Univ. Cal. San
[Vol. 18
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agreement concerning the extent of that contribution and whether
capital flight, or the threat of it, continues to be a problem.
In most countries, capital movements have become an increas-
ingly important factor in the balance of payments and conse-
quently, in determining exchange rates. As noted by Henry Kauf-
man, the senior economist at Salomon Brothers: "This trend toward
greater capital mobility has several important policy implications.
More than ever before, capital flows-not trade flows-are now the
principal determinant of exchange-rate movements." 7
This statement applies not only to the economies of capital-rich
countries like the United States, West Germany or Japan; but also
to countries such as Mexico. Mexico's 1982 financial crisis was not
caused by a softening of oil prices, or by increased consumption of
imported goods. Rather, it was caused primarily by forces related
to capital flows-more precisely, by an increase in two types of cap-
ital outflows: (1) funds needed to service the increasingly burden-
some number of foreign loans, and (2) funds sought by Mexican
businesses and individuals as a hedge against the falling peso (i.e.,
capital flight).
The government dealt directly to staunch capital outflows in" the
first category, the servicing of external debt. It simply refused to
make all payments called for under sovereign loans, and it used
pressure-principally, the adoption of the FICORCA Program-to
persuade foreign creditors to accept the rescheduling of payments
due on private debt.'
Stopping capital flight was not so easy. At the outset, the govern-
ment of President Lopez Portillo took the drastic step of imposing
strict exchange controls to prevent Mexicans from acquiring foreign
Diego, Monograph Series, No 12 (D. Wyman, ed. 1983)); Mexico: Progress and Prospects,
WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS, (Morgan Guaranty Trust) May, 1984, at 1; Zamora, Peso-
Dollar Economics and the Imposition of Foreign Exchange Controls in Mexico, 32
AM.J.CoMP.L. 99, 103 (1984).
According to R. LOONEY, ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING IN MEXICO 45 (1985), the deficit in
errors and omissions, one measure of capital flight, jumped by 180% from 1980 to 1981:
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Errors and -2454 -459 -18 703 -1961 -5506
omissions
Significant capital flight accompanied earlier financial crises, in the 1950s and in the mid-
1970s. D. BROTHERS & L. SOLIS. MEXICAN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 85, 87 (1966) (com-
menting on capital flight during the 1950s); D. LOONEY, MEXICO'S ECONOMY: A POLICY
ANALYSIS WITH FORECASTS TO 1990 114, 118, 120 (1978) (commenting on capital flight at
end of Echeverria sexenio in 1976).
7. H. KAUFMAN, supra note 3, at 88.
8. See the description of FICORCA in PORTAL, The Restructuring of Mexican Pri-
vate Debt, I DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO, Chapter 25-C (S. Lefler, ed. 1986).
1987]
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capital for that purpose.9 These controls were then relaxed, and a
form of liberalized exchange control was adopted, which allowed
Mexicans greater freedom in acquiring dollars and making interna-
tional transfers.
A. What is Capital Flight?
Capital flight is an unpopular subject, even among economists,
who are accustomed to dealing with unpopular subjects. Not only is
capital flight difficult to quantify, it is difficult to define. Economists
differ as to what capital flight is, and to the data that should be
used to quantify it. Some focus on the "errors and omissions" cate-
gory of the balance of payments. This is a rough measure of unre-
corded flows as well as of statistical errors. A negative figure for
errors and omissions represents unrecorded capital outflows."0
Others use a more expansive definition of capital flight, such as
"the reported and unreported acquisition of foreign assets by the
nonbank private sector and some elements of the public sector."11
Another measure is the "sum of gross capital inflows and the cur-
renf account deficit, less increases in official foreign reserves. '"2
The Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit has been
sufficiently annoyed by expansive definitions, and the results de-
rived from them, that it recently published a pointed criticism of
using such definitions in calculating capital flight.13
U
9. See generally Zamora, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., Goldsbrough & Zaidi, Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook,
supra note 2, at 182 (citing Cuddington, "Capital Flight: Estimates, Issues, and Explana-
tions," an unpublished discussion paper (March 1985)):
[slome rough estimates of capital flight can be made on the basis of the errors and
omissions category in the balance of payments accounts. Cuddington (1985) has
argued that the errors and omissions category plus certain sub-categories of the line
item "other short-term capital, other sector" in the balance of payments accounts
may be used to estimate capital flight.
For a clear discussion of definitional problems, see Khan & UI Haque, Capital Flight from
Developing Countries, 2-3 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT Vol. 24 (No. I) (1987).
I1. LDC Capital Flight, WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS, (Morgan Guaranty Trust)
(March 1986) at 13. This same study translates this general definition into a formula, as
follows: "the counterpart of the sum of net direct investment inflows, change in gross exter-
nal debt, current account balance, and change in selected gross foreign assets [primarily
foreign assets of monetary authorities and of banks]." Id.
12. Mexicos Crisis Grows as Money and the Rich Both Seek Safer Places, Wall
Street Journal, Nov. II, 1985, at I.
13. Precisiones sobre el calculo de la fuga de capitales, EL MERCADO DE VALORES,
Ano XLVI, Num. 21, May 26, 1986, at 516.
[Vol. 18
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B. Problems in Quantifying Capital Flight
Quantifying capital flight is even more problematical than defin-
ing it. According to a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF)
report, "[riegardless of how broadly or narrowly one defines capital
flight, assessing its quantitative importance is difficult because of
the imprecision with which financial transactions are often reported
in countries' balance of payments.""'
The estimates of capital flight from Mexico for the period pre-
ceding 1982 have varied. The Wall Street Journal, citing World
Bank estimates, reported that capital flight from Mexico during the
period 1979-1982 amounted to 26.5 billion dollars, and noted that
Mexico's Central Bank acknowledges that at least 33 billion dollars
flowed out of the country from 1977 to 1984.15 Ingo Walter esti-
mates capital flight from Mexico, during 1980 to 1982, at about 26
billion dollars."6 Walter estimates capital flight from Mexico during
the period 1974-1982 at close to 40 billion dollars-an amount rep-
resenting 43% of the net external debt incurred during the period."
According to Morgan Guaranty Trust, capital flight from Mexico
during the last decade amounted to 50 billion dollars. 8 This figure
does not seem outrageously high if one considers the capital flight
at the end of the Echeverria regime, and leads Morgan Guaranty to
conclude that had it not been for capital flight during the past dec-
ade, the gross external debt of Mexico would only be 12 billion
dollars. This would be a quite manageable sum in comparison to
the 97 billion dollars of debt actually incurred to the end of 1985.",
C. Capital Flight After 1982
Capital flight did not stop after the crisis of 1982. It did slow
slightly due to the high price and relative unavailability of dollars
between 1982 and 1984. However, after 1982 the negative figures
14. STAFF STUDIES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 2, at 182. The
economists at Morgan Guaranty Trust discuss several sources of uncertainty stemming from
misreporting of transactions and "valuation effects [methods of placing value on foreign as-
sets and liabilities). LDC Capital Flight, supra note 11, at 13-14. The problems of measur-
ing capital flight are also discussed in Khan and UI Hague, supra note 10, at 3-4.
15. Wall Street Journal, supra note 12, at 1.
16. I. WALTER. SECRET MONEY: THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SECRECY
42 (1985).
17. Id. at 43. Kahn & UI Haque, supra note 10, at 4, gives estimates of 29.4 to 32.7
billion dollars for the same period, depending on method of measurement.
18. Growth and Financial Market Reform in Latin America, WORLD FINANCIAL
MARKETS (Morgan Guaranty Trust) (April/May 1986) 1 at 10 .
19. LDC Capital Flight, supra note I1, at 15.
19871
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continued in the errors and omissions line of the Mexican balance
of payments. These figures can be interpreted as a rough measure
of "hidden" or unrecorded capital flight.20
As Table 121 shows, using the sum of net errors and omissions
and other short-term capital as a rough indicator of capital flight, 22
the period after 1982 showed a continuation of short-term capital
outflows. While the figures for net errors and omissions became
smaller after 1982, recorded short-term capital outflows increased.
The combined effect showed a continuing strain on the balance of
payments for a country trying to save foreign exchange in order to
service its external debt.
Further evidence of the continuation of capital flight from 1982
to 1985 can be seen in statistics published by the U.S. Treasury
Department. Table 1123 shows the deposits in U.S. banks held by
Mexicans.
Table I124 shows a steady increase in Mexican deposits in the
Table I
Selected Balance of Payments Statistics
(figures in millions of SDRs)
1. Net errors and omissions
1978 1979 1980 1981
-104 501 -2901 -7054
II. Other short-term capital, other sectors
1978 1979 1980 1981
-430 -863 2151 3374
I. and II. combined
1978 1979 1980 1981
-534 -362 -750 -3680
1982 1983 1984 1985*
-4890 -981 -974 -1410
1982 1983 1984 1985
-2013 -4962 -3801 -1477
1982 1983 1984 1985
-6903 -5843 -4775 -2887
* First two quarters of year only
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook
Volume 37, Part 1, 1986, p. 434
21. See supra note 20.
22. See supra note 10.
23.
Table I
Deposits held by Mexicans in U.S. banks
(position at end of period, in billions of dollars)
1981 1982 1983 1984
7.351 8.607 10.739 12.614
1985 1986*
14.549 13.438
* period ending June, 1986
Source: U.S. Treasury Bulletins, Winter 1984, 1985, 1986
24. See supra note 23.
1980
4.569
[Vol. 18
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United States leading up to the crisis year of 1982; however, the
drain continues after that year. Most of these deposits are held in
the form of demand and time deposits by Mexican citizens and
nonbanking companies. For example, of the 14.5 billion dollars held
on deposit in 1985, approximately 12 billion dollars consisted of
time and demand deposits, and certificates of deposit, held by peo-
ple other than official institutions, and unaffiliated foreign banks.25
The U.S. Treasury is careful to point out that it only reports
Mexican-source deposits that are identified as such by reporting
banks. It is therefore probable that the actual figures for the in-
crease in cash outflow to U.S. banks by Mexicans would be greater
than these figures indicate if one added deposits made on behalf of
Mexicans by U.S. citizens and others. For instance, as of December
1985, deposits held in U.S. banks by "persons" of the British West
Indies totalled 43.4 billion dollars.26 One can assume that many of
these deposits came from offshore investment banks that were actu-
ally handling capital flight money from Latin Americans and
others, including Mexicans.
These figures are more striking when one compares them with
deposits held by Mexicans in their own banks. Morgan Guaranty
Trust has estimated that Mexican non-bank deposits held abroad
(in the United States and elsewhere) grew from 9.4 billion dollars
in 1981 to 15.3 billion dollars in 1985.27 Domestic banking deposits
by non-banks were estimated to equal 35.8 billion dollars in 1985.
Comparing the figures, Morgan Guaranty Trust calculated that the
amount of money held by Mexicans in banks abroad amounted to
43% of Mexican held deposits. The estimate appears high, and the
Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit has criticized Morgan
Guaranty for playing loosely with such figures.2 8 Using figures is-
sued by the Mexican government for peso deposits held by the
Mexican banking system in July 1985, and dividing them by the
conservative estimate of 15 billion dollars held in foreign banks (at
the exchange rate of 300 pesos to the dollar, as a rough estimate"),
one finds that foreign deposits were 18.5% of domestic deposits. Be-
cause these figures for foreign deposits are conservative, and do not
25. Treasury Bulletin, Winter issue, Fiscal 1986, at 150.
26. Id.
27. Growth and Financial Market Reform in Latin America, supra note 18, at 10.
28. Precisiones sobre el calculo de la fuga de capitales, supra note 13, at 516.
29. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 11 (International
Monetary Fund) (Nov. 1985) at 16. This figure computed from July 1985 exchange rates for
the dollar ($1.03) and the peso (P.291) per SDR.
19871
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include deposits held by others for the benefit of Mexicans, the ac-
tual percentage is probably somewhere between the Morgan Guar-
anty calculation of 43%, and the government measure of 18.5%.80
There is some evidence that this penchant for placing funds in
U.S. banks may be in the process of being reversed. In Table 11,31
the figures for 1986 show a decline in Mexican deposits in U.S.
banks. This reflects a concerted effort by the Mexican monetary
authorities to foster interest rates that make short-term investments
in pesos attractive to Mexicans who may wish to repatriate some of
this capital. According to a recent report by Banamex, stability in
the exchange market in the interim will be aided by "[e]xchange
and monetary policies, whose objectives include encouraging do-
mestic savings, thereby promoting a favorable climate for the repa-
triation of capital."32 For example, holders of one-month promis-
sory notes in Mexico, with real earnings of 23.32% in October
1986, could earn more than three times the real return for dollar
deposits in any U.S. bank. a" However, much capital still remains
abroad. It may be that some of the funds moved out of U.S. banks
have been used for stock purchases by Mexicans participating in
the current stock market boom.
Swings of short-term capital between 1980 and 1986 have added
to the disruption of the Mexican economy during the concurrent
periods of balance of payment pressure. One of the theses advanced
here is that the capital flight will continue to complicate, and to
pose a serious threat to, the Mexican government's economic poli-
cies. The trend is towards increasing integration of a sophisticated
international financial market thriving on the short-term movement
of capital. If this is coupled with volatile interest rates, unstable
currency markets, rising inflation, major shifts in stock prices, or
other indicators, then the natural result is capital flight.
Some economists argue that capital flight is a good thing; that it
compensates for other movements in the balance of payments, and
forces governments to make the necessary adjustments to attract
30. EL MERCADO DE VALORES, Ano XLVI, Num. 46, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1090.
24,254 billion pesos in Mexican deposits - $U.S. 80.8 billion
300 (exchange rate)
$U.S. 15 billion foreign depositsSUS.IS illon oregn epoits= .1856 (approx. 18.5 percent)
$U.S. 80.8 billion Mexican deposits
31. See supra note 23.
32. Banamex, REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF MEXICO, Vol. LXII, Number
732 (Nov. 1986) at 436-38.
33. Id. at 436.
[Vol. 18
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the capital back. Nevertheless, even these commentators concede
that capital flight is disruptive in the short-term, and requires the
government to adopt policies specifically designed to reduce capital
flight.
II. POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH CAPITAL FLIGHT
In the fall of 1985, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker
launched a program to deal with the external debts of developing
nations. The "Baker Plan" encompassed three major elements: (1)
restructuring the economies of indebted nations; (2) increased lend-
ing from the IMF and the multilateral development banks; and (3)
increased lending by private banks. 4 In discussing the restructuring
of the borrowers' economies, Secretary Baker specifically raised the
issue of capital flight, and gave his solution to it:
As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to call upon the support of
voluntary lending from abroad when domestic funds are moving
in the other direction. Capital flight must be reversed if there is to
be any real prospect of additional funding.
Policies to address these problems should include market-deter-
mined interest rates, wages and prices as well as further efforts to
reduce inflation and budget deficits. We would also like to see:
[m]ore supply-side actions to mobilize domestic savings and fa-
cilitate efficient investment, by means of tax reform, labor market
reform and the development of financial markets . ..
34. The basic Baker Plan is set forth in Documentation Concerning Development and
International Debt Issues 25 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 412 (No. 2, March, 1986)
[hereinafter Baker Plan].
35. Id. at 423.
The same notion-the need to restructure financial markets to attract repatriated capi-
tal-was raised, somewhat more stridently, by economists at Morgan Guaranty Bank. In a
study of Latin American financial markets published last April, Morgan Guaranty focused
on conditions in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The article criticized government interven-
tion in financial markets in Mexico, which it found overly dominated by the federal govern-
ment as the major borrower. The study criticized government controls on interest rates, the
tax treatment of interest, and accounting rules ill-suited to an inflationary environment.
Growth and Financial Market Reform in Latin America, supra note 18, at 3. The study
concluded:
Financial markets in Latin America are not performing
their vital development role of eliciting higher savings and investing savings effi-
ciently. And they are not geared up to attract significant reflow of residents' assets
now held abroad.
[lit is important, therefore, that financial market
reform be undertaken in the contest of wide-ranging reforms seeking to get all the
key prices right.
1987]
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A. A Glance Back at Mexican Financial Policy
The call to restructure financial markets has not come only from
abroad. Many Mexicans have been calling for reforms for decades.
The desire for reform must be seen against the backdrop of a finan-
cial system which is heavily dominated by the government. The fol-
lowing analysis, taken from a 1978 study of the Mexican economy,
characterized the monetary and credit policies of the Mexican gov-
ernment as follows:
In Mexico, monetary policy has developed so that the government
is now deeply involved in providing direct finance for a wide vari-
ety of structural, industrial, and commercial activities; in influ-
encing the distribution of private banking funds to various sectors
of the economy; in maintaining the solvency of the banking sys-
tem and the individual banks; and in improving the financial mar-
kets .... The public ownership and control of Mexico's key fi-
nancial intermediaries [note that this was written before the
nationalization of the banks] affords the government considerable
opportunity to influence the direction and content of economic be-
havior through monetary and exchange policy.36
A key element of this dirigiste policy was the use of a high re-
serve requirement to channel savings (termed canalizacion) cap-
tured by the commercial banking system to government projects at
inexpensive rates of interest."7 Even beyond this reserve require-
ment, credit allocation rules mandated by monetary authorities di-
rected bank lending to priority, government-sponsored projects,
leaving relatively little for free allocation of credit to the private
sector.,8
Capital markets in Mexico have also been dominated by the pub-
lic sector. Historically, the Mexican stock exchange has not been
important in mobilizing capital for Mexican enterprises. There
have been few securities issued, and a marked lack of secondary
trading. The capital markets have been dominated by fixed-interest
bearing securities, and other securities, issued by the govern-
ment-Cetes (treasury bills) and Petrobonos. According to one
study, equity turnover on the Mexican Stock Exchange represents
36. LOONEY, supra note 6, at 27
37. Id. at 40-41. The high reserve requirement continues to be a mark of the Mexican
banking system. See Growth and Financial Market Reform in Latin America, supra note
18, at 5.
38. Growth and Financial Market Reform in Latin America, supra note 18, at 5-6.
According to this study, the freely lendable portion of new deposits fell to a low of 11% in
1985.
[Vol. 18
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only about 10% of the total securities market; the remainder being
represented mainly by petrobonos and treasury bills.3 9 Mexican
companies have consequently received the bulk of their capital from
bank credits (including credits from financieras) and private
placements. 40
From the viewpoint of the Mexican investor, the available oppor-
tunities for portfolio investment were limited. They were especially
limited with respect to investments offering a high rate of return.
One could invest in Cetes or Petrobonos, both of which became less
attractive as oil prices plunged. One could deposit money in the
bank, at an interest rate controlled by the government. Alterna-
tively, one could deposit money or invest in dollars in the United
States, where high real rates of return were possible with little risk.
The attractiveness of the last alternative was apparent, and capital
flight was the result.
B. Recent Financial Policies
The Mexican government has recently taken several steps to al-
ter the above scenario. These steps indicate some sensitivity to the
issues raised in the Baker Initiative, discussed above. " Neverthe-
less, there has not been a reversal in government financial policy in
Mexico. The public sector, with its enormous financing needs, will
continue to dominate credit markets.
Some of the policy changes undertaken by the Mexican govern-
ment involve changes in the law; others do not. The following re-
marks are intended as a comment on certain policies, rather than as
a comprehensive analysis of all government policies.
1. Exchange Controls-There have been relatively few adjust-
ments in the liberalized exchange control regulations adopted by
the government of President de la Madrid in late 1982 and 1983.2
39. L. KEMP, THE WARDLEY GUIDE TO WORLD MONEY AND SECURITIES MARKETS
237 (1984).
Alex Hoagland estimated in 1980 that, in 1977, transactions in common stock constituted
only 3.4 percent of total stock market transactions on the Mexican Stock Exchange, although
the figure increased in later years. Hoagland, Company Formation in Mexico at J-33
(Lloyd's Bank International 1980).
40. See LOONEY, ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING IN MEXICO, supra note 6, at 73; and
LOONEY, MEXICO'S ECONOMY: A POLICY ANALYSIS WITH FORECASTS TO 1990, supra note 6,
at 34.
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. See generally Gomez-Palacio, Mexico's Foreign Exchange Controls: Two Admin-
istrations - Two Solutions. Thorough and Benign, 16 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 268
(1984); V. Pando, Legal Aspects of Mexican Exchange Controls, 18 INT'L LAW. 309 (1984);
1987)
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Under those regulations, the purchase of foreign exchange for for-
eign investment, either short- or long-term, must be carried out on
the free exchange market, at exchange rates that now approach
2000 pesos to the dollar. 3 Theoretically, the dollars are available,
and capital transfer is possible through the banking system. For the
time being, the government appears to be committed to a policy of
using interest rates, rather than strict controls, to limit capital
flight.
One interesting change in the exchange market involves the ap-
pearance, for the first time, of a forward market in pesos author-:
ized by the Banco de Mexico." Until now, only banks were permit-
ted to carry out forward exchange transactions or other currency
hedging transactions. The addition of exporters and importers to
these operations signifies recognition that currency hedging is nec-
essary under current exchange market conditions to protect interna-
tional traders. However, the refusal to allow the public at large to
use such transactions represents the continued fear that unregu-
lated forward exchange markets could be used to speculate against
the peso.
2. Interest Rate Policies-No major legislative changes to
restructure capital markets have occurred in Mexico. However, the
government has taken several steps to enhance the attractiveness of
securities and to promote the development of an equity capital mar-
ket. It remains to be seen whether these steps will be sufficient to
re-orient the government-dominated system to provide viable
sources of private capital to businesses and attractive placements
for private investors.
One change has affected the levels of interest rates available on
bank deposits and securities in Mexico. Authorities in Mexico have
been criticized for their failure to keep interest rates at a positive
Zamora, supra note 36.
43. Since there is now a very small spread between the free and controlled exchange
rates, there is little left of the original government policy of shunting non-priority demand for
foreign exchange into a separate, more disadvantageous market that would reduce demand.
44. In December 1986, the Banco de Mexico announced the creation of a forward
market, [mercado de coberturas cambiarias a corto plazo] that would allow importers and
exporters of goods to cover foreign exchange risks by entering into forward exchange trans-
actions. Diario Oficial Lunes, 15 de diciembre de 1986, at p. 24. Guidelines for these opera-
tions were to be adopted by those banks (the major Mexican financial institutions) that were
permitted to carry out these transactions, with the implication that they would make them
available to exporters and importers only. One might ask the question whether such a market
could be used as a disguised form of active speculation against the peso.
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real level, competitive with returns in other countries.4 This ap-
pears to have changed. Interest rates on bank deposits and on short-
term promissory notes have registered impressive real rates of re-
turn during 1986.46 However, nominal interest rates must be raised
to provide such real rates of return. Inflation in Mexico last year
reached 110%.' The effects of raising interest rates to achieve real
rates of return in such an inflationary environment makes the gov-
ernment's task of stabilizing growth even more difficult.
3. Tax Amendments-As interest rates moved into triple-digits,
deductions by businesses for interest expenses also soared. Until re-
cently, Mexican tax law allowed companies to deduct interest ex-
penses as long as the borrowed funds were used for business pur-
poses.48 This resulted in an over-reliance on raising capital through
debt, rather than through equity, such as the issuance of new stock.
Large interest deductions contributed to a decline in corporate tax
revenues paid to the government, from 2.7% of gross domestic
product in 1980 to 1.4% in 1986. 9
The government responded in 1986 by adopting a major amend-
ment to the income tax law, introducing inflation indexation to the
business tax. Under amendments to the Ley del Impuesto Sobre La
Renta,50 deductible interest expenses will be calculated by sub-
tracting the inflationary component of the total from the interest
paid. Thus, if inflation is 100%, interest payments of 110 million
pesos will result in a deduction of only 10 million pesos. The drastic
nature of this and other tax amendments caused the government to
phase in the change over a period of three years.51 Nevertheless,
the reform will force many companies to forego borrowing from
banks or from issuing debt instruments. Theoretically, it will make
them raise capital by issuing shares to the public. This remains to
45. See Growth and Financial Market Reform in Latin America, supra note 18, at 8-
9.
46. Banamex, REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF MEXICO, supra note 32, at
435-37.
47. Id. at 461. The Banco de Mexico, in January, 1987, reported that consumer prices
soared 105.7% in 1986. Mexico Prices in Record Rise, New York Times, Monday, January
12, 1987, at 29.
48. Ley del Impuesto Sobre la Renta, Article 24, para. ViII, discussed in Business
Operations in Mexico, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO, Vol 136-4th (1984) at p. A-12.
See also Hoagland, supra note 34, at D-9.
49. Banamex, Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, supra note 32, at 455.
50. Decreto que reforma. adiciona y deroga diversas disposiciones de la Ley del Im-
puesto Sobre la Renta, Diario Oficial, Miercoles, 31 de diciembre de 1986, at 53 et seq.
51. Still-Developing Tax Reform Looks Bad for Business, American Chamber of
Commerce of Mexico, MEXICO UPDATE, VOl. V, No. 2, November 15, 1986, at 3.
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be seen, however. Mexico does not have a tradition of broad public
ownership of shares in corporations. Small- and medium-sized cor-
porations have not tended to use the stock market to raise capital.
Public ownership would dilute the power of the many closely-held
corporations in Mexico. Furthermore, issuing shares on the Mexi-
can Stock Exchange requires registration and filing of information
with the National Securities Commission,"2 which many companies
may be reluctant to do.
4. New Debt Instruments-The Mexican government recently
launched a program to offer more attractive public debt instru-
ments to attract investors away from U.S. Treasury bills and other
dollar-denominated securities. In August, 1986, the Mexican gov-
ernment announced a new government 'security-the Pagafe
(Pagares de la Tesoreria de la Federacion)-to join the Petrobo-
nos and Cetes already on the market. 3 The Pagafe is to be sold at
a discount of its face value, for which it can be redeemed in six
months. The key is that the Pagafe will be denominated in dollars,
providing a hedge against the continued slide of the peso. However,
the Pagafe will be payable in Mexico in pesos rather than dollars.
Thus far, the Pagafe experiment has been unsuccessful. The ini-
tial offering in August of 1986 proved disappointing in volume, and
even after raising the discount rate, nobody was willing to purchase
Pagafes in November. The reluctance seems to be based on the
government's guarantee to pay Pagafes, in pesos, at the controlled
exchange rate applicable at the time of redemption-a rate man-
aged by the government and therefore distrusted by some
investors.5'
5. Debt-for-Equity Swaps-Under debt-for-equity swaps, for-
eign creditors of public sector agencies can immediately receive pe-
sos equivalent to the full amount of the foreign-currency denomi-
nated loan, if used for approved purposes in Mexico. One approved
purpose under this government-sponsored program includes the
purchase of state enterprises that the government wishes to priva-
tize. In addition, private debtors, such as Grupo Alfa, have con-
52. M. ACOSTA ROMERO, DERECHO BANCARIO: PANORAMA DEL SISTEMA FINANCIERO
MEXICANO 788 (3d ed. 1986).
53. Caracteristicas definitivas de los Pagafes' EL MERCADO DE VALORES, Ano XLVI,
Num. 34, Aug. 25, 1986, at 816.
54. Pagafe Makes Humble Exit; Called First Failure of the PAC, American Cham-
ber of Commerce of Mexico, MEXICO UPDATE, Vol. V., No. 2, Nov. 15, 1986, at 9.
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vinced foreign creditors to exchange a portion of outstanding debt
for shares in the corporation.
Debt-for-equity swaps are likely to retain only temporary signifi-
cance, without a change in the foreign investment laws of Mexico
limiting foreign ownership.5 Mexican officials appear to view the
program as a temporary mechanism to attract foreign investment,
and many expect the program to become gradually more
restrictive."
6. The Stock Market Boom-The Bolsa Mexicana de Valores
has recovered from the post-1982 slump to share some of the world-
wide euphoria experienced as a result of the strong performances
registered on stock exchanges in London, New York, Tokyo and
elsewhere. In 1986, investors in the Mexican stock market earned
real rates of return in excess of 100%, a figure that is expected to
level off to the 25% range in 1987.57 Phenomenal increases in share
prices (the Bolsa index has risen 705% since September, 198568)
have been recorded. The gains have not been achieved by any gov-
ernment-organized restructuring; there have been no major changes
in the laws regulating the capital markets. These gains have been
recorded simply because the shares of companies traded on the
Bolsa were seriously undervalued.
The Mexican stock market boom must be put into perspective.
The operations of the Mexican Stock Exchange are of small volume
in comparison with the size of the economy. 9 Only 100 different
stocks are listed, and only 40 of these are considered to be very
marketable. The daily trading volume is valued at barely 6 million
dollars.60 Thus, the recent reawakening of investor interest cannot
by itself be taken as an indication of a broad awakening of free-
market capitalism.
This brief summary of government policies and non-policies
(which is not intended to be comprehensive) indicates a moderate
shift in the direction of restructuring financial markets along the
55. See generally J. BARRERA GRAF, LA REGULACION JURIDICA DE LAS INVERSIONES
EXTRANJERAS EN MEXICO (1981); Hoagland, supra note 39, chapters B and C.
56. Orme, Swaps spur foreign investment in Mexico, Financial Times of London, Jan-
uary 5, 1987, at 18.
57. Barbash, Investors Flock to Booming Stock Market, The Mexico City News, Jan-
uary 19, 1987.
58. Stockton, Stock Frenzy Grips Mexico, New York Times, Tuesday, January 13,
1987, at 32.
59. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
60. Investors Flock to Booming Stock Market, supra note 57.
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lines called for by the Baker Initiative. The Mexican financial sys-
tem continues to be dominated by the public sector. However, the
government has a heightened perception of the need to create an
attractive investment climate to keep Mexican investors interested
in keeping their capital in Mexico.
CONCLUSION: THE RESTRUCTURING OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
WILL NOT PREVENT CAPITAL FLIGHT
An axiom of international economic theory holds that the three
principal objectives of international monetary policy-(1) autono-
mous control over domestic monetary policy; (2) free movement of
capital and goods; and (3) stability of foreign exchange and finan-
cial markets-are unlikely to be achieved at any one time.6" The
most that monetary authorities can hope to achieve is two of the
three goals at once. For example, if monetary authorities set do-
mestic policies with a view solely to local needs (the first objective),
and allow capital and goods to move freely (the second objective);
then fluctuations in foreign markets may either drain capital or
flood the country with it. The result is disruption of stability of for-
eign exchange and capital markets (the third objective).
This is a useful axiom with which to assess the effect of capital
flight in Mexico. Under current conditions, Mexico has moved to-
wards achieving free movement of capital and goods, the second
objective. Rigid exchange controls failed to cut off capital flight
and were abandoned. The import-substitution policies of earlier ad-
ministrations have been replaced by an emphasis on export promo-
tion and trade liberalization, as evidenced by Mexico's entry into
the GATT.
The trick comes with the trade-off between the first and third
objectives. The Mexican government appears to be leaning in favor
of the third objective, concentrating on stability of exchange rates
and of financial markets. This may seem surprising at first, when
one considers the drastic fall of the peso. However, this has been a
gradual, controlled slide, with peso devaluation keeping in step with
the rate of domestic inflation. Financial markets have also become
somewhat stabilized-at least as stable as one can hope for in an
economy with triple-digit inflation.
61. See T. PADOA-SCHIOPPA, MONEY, ECONOMIC POLICY AND EUROPE 106-107 EEC,
Brussels (1985); D. LLEWELLYN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 3, 1984 (1980);
Goodhart, Has the Time Come for the UK to Join the EMS?, THE BANKER, February,
1986, at 26, 28.
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Autonomy over domestic monetary policy is what has been sacri-
ficed. Mexican government authorities have found themselves on an
inflationary ride that has gradually been building for ten years. It
would be nice to get off the roller coaster and to adopt policies that
would quickly put the brakes to inflation. But how does one achieve
this, when it is necessary at the same time to keep real interest
rates high so that Mexicans don't send their money abroad? The
government's policy of promoting high rates of return has made
controlling inflation even more difficult."
This is only one example of the autonomy which Mexico loses by
having to adopt policies in reaction to events beyond its borders. To
ignore such events in planning domestic policies-to overlook the
level of interest rates -in the United States, or movements in the
New York stock market-produces the risk of destabilizing capital
flows. 63
Returning to the question of capital flows, even if Mexico totally
restructured its financial industry, offering a wide scope of invest-
ment opportunities to attract Mexican savers, the threat of capital
flight would persist and must remain a factor in government deci-
sion-making. The growth of an increasingly integrated global finan-
cial market assures this result. The development of highly-liquid
capital markets around the world; and the readily available invest-
ment services allowing Mexicans to tap into foreign markets, will
facilitate both the outflow and the inflow of capital.
Government officials in the United States should be more sensi-
tive to the dilemma facing nations like Mexico, which must dance
to tunes composed in Washington, Tokyo, London, and Bonn.
When the United States undertakes policies to attract capital by
increasing interest rates, or abolishes the withholding tax on inter-
est earned by foreign residents, it may severely disrupt the plans of
Mexican monetary authorities. The United States tends to coordi-
nate such actions with a group of only ten countries. We could do
62. I realize that high interest rates are supposed to result in lower rates of borrowing,
and should be deflationary. However, if there is a perception that high rates of interest can
be passed along to consumers, then companies will continue to borrow. Because Mexican
companies have operated in a protected environment due to import-promotion policies, they
have been able to earn high rates of profit on sales, and for that reason have been willing to
continue borrowing.
63. Of course, Mexico is not alone in its dilemma. As a leading U.S. economist has
recently pointed out, our own sensitivity to interest rate developments abroad has soared.
Kaufman, supra note 3, at 179. Yet the United States has a good deal more leverage over
these matters than does Mexico, and because of the size and diversity of our economy the
United Stated maintains more freedom of action. Mexico, pushed to the wall on several
fronts-inflation, external debt, etc.-has little margin for maneuver.
1987]
17
Zamora: Mexico and the Global Financial Market: Capital Flight as a Facto
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
52 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
more to involve Mexican officials in consultations over policies that
will affect capital flows to the United States. If we fail to do so, it
weakens the force of our complaints over unilateral actions taken
by debtor countries such as Mexico.
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